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Empirical contributions show that wage re-negotiations take place
while expiring contracts are still in place. This is captured by assuming
that nominal wages are pre-determined. As a consequence, wage setters
act as Stackelberg leaders, whereas in the typical New Keynesian model
the wage-setting rule implies that they play a Nash game. We present a
DSGE New Keynesian model with pre-determined wages and money en-
tering the representative household￿ s utility function and show how these
assumptions are su¢ cient to identify an inverse relationship between the
in￿ ation target and the wage markup (and thus employment) both in the
short and the long run. This is due to the complementary e⁄ects that wage
claims and the in￿ ation target have on money holdings. Model estimates
suggest that a moderate long-run in￿ ation rate generates non-negligible
output gains
Jel codes: E52, E58, J51, E24.
Keywords: trend in￿ ation, long-run Phillips curve, in￿ ation targeting,
real money balances.
1 Introduction
Recent developments in macroeconomics contradict the widely held belief that
permanently higher in￿ ation cannot a⁄ect output and employment. A long-run
relationship between in￿ ation and real activity is obtained in New Keynesian
models based on price staggering, where in￿ ation has adverse e⁄ects due to rel-
ative price dispersion and to the e⁄ect of expectations on mark-ups (Goodfriend
￿The authors are grateful to T. Palivos, S. Adjemian, G. Ascari, P. Benigno, H. Dixon,
A. Cukierman, J. Dri¢ ll, F. Giuli, M. Juillard, S. Gnocchi, L. Lambertini, F. Mattesini, D.
Soskice, M. Tancioni, seminar participants at the Universities of Crete, Pavia, Milan Bicocca,
Rome CEIS Seminar (Tor Vergata), for useful comments on earlier drafts.
1and King, 1997; Woodford, 2003; Schmitt-GrohŁ and Uribe, 2004). Other con-
tributions point to the opposite direction. Benigno and Ricci (2011) resurrect
the ￿grease in the wheels￿argument, showing that low in￿ ation rates disciplines
monopolistic wage setters in case of downward nominal wage rigidity. In Gra-
ham and Snower (2008) the combination of staggered nominal wage contracts
and hyperbolic discounting leads to a positive long-run e⁄ect of in￿ ation on real
variables.
We share the view that New Keynesian models may underestimate the bene-
￿cial e⁄ects of in￿ ation on wage markups, but we highlight a di⁄erent disciplin-
ing channel. According to recent empirical evidence, wage renegotiations take
place while expiring contracts are still in place (Du Caju et al., 2008), enabling
wage setters to internalize the expected consequences of their actions over the
life of the future contract. This feature of observed wage-setting practices plays
a critical role in our model, because we are able to show that the anticipation
of future in￿ ation unambiguously disciplines wage markups.
The key innovation of the paper is that wage setters decisions anticipate the
subsequent choices of price setters, consumers and policymakers. This is cap-
tured by assuming that nominal wages are pre-determined. As a consequence,
in our model wage setters act as Stackelberg leaders, whereas in the typical New
Keynesian model the wage-setting rule implies that they play a Nash game. For
the model to replicate the degree of nominal wage inertia typically observed
over the business cycle, we incorporate the assumption of pre-determined nom-
inal wages into an otherwise standard sticky-wage model, based on Rotemberg
(1982) quadratic adjustment cost. Another important feature of our model is
that money enters the representative household￿ s utility function. The pre-
determined wages and money-in-the-utility-function assumptions are su¢ cient
to identify an inverse relationship between the central bank long-run in￿ ation
target and the steady-state wage markup.
The rationale behind this result is simple. Both a positive in￿ ation target
and a consumption fall are associated to a higher marginal utility from real
money balances (MUM in short). In the paper we show that wage setters
internalize the adverse e⁄ect of a wage increase on consumption and are therefore
induced to moderate their wage claims in order to limit the expected increase in
MUM. Since the impact of a consumption fall on MUM grows with the expected
in￿ ation rate, we obtain a new justi￿cation for the existence of a non-vertical
Phillips curve.
In order to assess the empirical relevance of our theoretical results we esti-
mate the model for the US economy using Bayesian estimation techniques. We
estimate a substantial disciplining e⁄ect on wage markups over the post-1983
sample, when average in￿ ation has been relatively low. Further, the empirical
performance of our model is strictly better than the standard alternative where
wages are sticky but the predetermined wages assumption is ruled out.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines
our model. Section 3 discusses the steady state features of our model and,
characterizes the wage moderation e⁄ect associated to a positive in￿ ation rate.
Section 4 takes the model to the data by using Bayesian estimation techniques.
Section 5 characterizes our estimated long-run Phillips curve and presents the
impulse response functions to an interest rate shock. Section 6 concludes.
22 The model
We consider a simple DSGE model without capital, where inertia is driven by
consumption habits and by price and nominal wage rigidities. Monetary policy
chooses the long-run in￿ ation target and implements a Taylor rule. In addi-
tion, we nest the assumption of pre-determined nominal wages into a standard
Rotemberg (1982) wage-setting rule.
2.1 Households





















where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the intertemporal discount rate, ct;i is a consumption bundle,
b denotes internal habits, lt;i is a di⁄erentiated labor type that is supplied to all
￿rms, Mt;i=Pt denotes real money holdings, ￿t is a scale parameter. Following
Neiss (1999), we set ￿t = ￿mA
"￿1
t , where At de￿nes a non-stationary produc-
tivity factor. This guarantees that the model has a balanced growth path along

















where Bt;i denotes holdings of one-period bonds, wt;i = Wt;i=Pt is the real wage,
￿t denotes ￿rms pro￿ts, ￿t is a lump-sum transfer from central bank pro￿ts, Rt
is the nominal interest rate.












, where ￿ is a parameter that characterizes stan-
dard Dixit-Stiglitz preferences.



















where ￿t+1 = Pt+1=Pt denotes the gross in￿ ation rate.














1See Neiss (1999), Christiano et al. (2005) and Gal￿ et al. (2007).
3Here we assume " > 1, which is su¢ cient to ensure that, coeteris paribus, the
marginal cost to in￿ ating is positive (see Neiss, 1999).
The optimal labor supply condition will be introduced at a later stage, when
we consider the wage-setting regime.
2.2 Firms￿pricing decisions
Each ￿rm (j) produces a di⁄erentiated good using the production function:
yt;j = Atlt;j (7)
















= ln(￿) + aa;t (9)
aa;t = ￿aaa;t￿1 + "a;t















de￿nes the wage index.
We assume a sticky price speci￿cation based on Rotemberg (1982) quadratic





where ￿t = ￿t
￿
￿p
t￿1￿1￿￿p . In line with Ascari et al. (2010), the re-optimization cost
is proportional to output4 and depends on the ratio between the newly reset
price and the previous-period price, adjusted by a geometric average (￿p 2 [0;1])
of steady state in￿ ation, ￿, and of past in￿ ation.5
The price adjustment rule is:
￿ ￿ mct
1 ￿ ￿











2Assumptions about the distribution of "a;t are discussed in our empirical section.
3The cost of price adjustment is transferred to consumers through a reduction in pro￿ts.
4By making price adjustment costs proportional to current output we obtain that the
output costs of in￿ation are constant along the balanced growth path.
5This assumption is common to several empirical contributions (Giannoni and Woodford,
2004; Christiano et al. 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2003, 2005, 2007; Jondeau and Sahuc, 2008;
Coenen and Warne, 2008; Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez, 2005; Levin et al., 2006; Justiniano
and Primiceri, 2008). It ensures that the Phillips curve is vertical in the long run. We make
it here in order to sharpen the empirical analysis on the e⁄ectiveness of the wage-setting






de￿nes real marginal costs.
2.3 Wage-setting decisions
Given (8), the labour market is characterized by monopolistic competition.










Under ￿ exible wages the standard wage-setting condition





obtains, where ￿w = ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
￿1 denotes the gross wage markup.
The key innovation of the paper concerns the way we model nominal wage
rigidity. Our approach is based on the conjecture that, when setting contracts,
wage setters internalize the consequences of their choices for economic outcomes
over the life of the contract. This is consistent with recent empirical micro-level
evidence on wage bargaining, which shows that wage renegotiations take place
while expiring contracts are still in place (Du Caju et al., 2008). A standard way
to capture this e⁄ect is to assume that in t nominal wages are pre-determined,
i.e. they are set before shock realizations and the corresponding private sector
and monetary policy responses are observed. More formally, this implies that
Wt(i) is set conditional to information available in t ￿ 1.6
To highlight the implications of our approach, we characterize the solution of
the wage-setting problem when wages are pre-determined, abstracting from wage
adjustment costs, which will be introduce shortly. In this case, the representative
household sets the nominal wage rate, Wt (i), that maximizes (1), conditional
















































the crucial di⁄erence is that households anticipate that real money balances
will fall due to the adverse e⁄ect of the wage choice on consumption. This,
in turn, has a disciplining e⁄ect on the real wage choice. The rationale for
this result is as follows. Under ￿ exible wages, the wage-setters￿optimization
problem is solved by choosing a real wage such that consumption falls below
6This approach to modelling nominal wage rigidity in a static framework was popularized
by standard Barro and Gordon models.
5the perfectly competitive rate. This loss of utility is more than compensated for
by the corresponding reduction in labor e⁄ort. When wages are predetermined,
households also anticipate that real money balances fall due to the adverse e⁄ect
of the wage choice on consumption. The term ￿m captures the impact of a real
wage increase on expected real money holdings.
For the model to replicate the degree of nominal wage inertia typically ob-
served over the business cycle, we incorporate this assumption into an otherwise














￿w(￿w)(1￿￿w). In line with the assumptions made for the price-
setting mechanism, the re-optimization cost is proportional to the product of
labour7 and depends on the ratio between the newly reset wage and the previous-
period wage, adjusted by a geometric average (￿w 2 [0;1]) of steady state wage
in￿ ation, ￿w, and of past wage in￿ ation ￿w
t￿1.8



































2.4 Aggregate resource constraint
The aggregate resource constraint accounts for price and nominal wage adjust-
ment costs.




























where parameter ￿m captures interest rate smoothing, R de￿nes the steady-state
value of the nominal interest rate. Following Lubik and Schorfeide (2006) the
interest rule reacts to in￿ ation deviations from target (￿) and to deviations of the
actual growth rate from the growth rate of the productivity factor. According
to (21) the interest rate therefore reacts to the growth rate gap instead of the
standard output gap measure.
7By making wage adjustment costs proportional to labour product we obtain that the
output costs of wage in￿ation are constant along the balanced growth path.
8Indexation to wage in￿ation implies that nominal wage adjustment to long run produc-



















￿ = ￿p de￿nes the ￿ exible price markup. This implies that real wages
grow with the productivity factor. Using (23), (24) and (20), the steady state























































de￿nes the employment level that would obtain
if we removed the pre-determined wages assumption.
Note that when " > 1 the the marginal utility from holding real money bal-
ances increases with in￿ ation and falls with employment. Under pre-determined
wages, wage setters internalize the increase in the marginal utility of real money
holdings which is associated to a positive variation of the real wage. Condition
(26) shows that this e⁄ect unambiguously grows with the in￿ ation target. In
Appendix A we show that l is unambiguously increasing in ￿ when " > 1. This
is the essence of our theoretical result.
4 Estimates and tests
In order to evaluate our results and compare our benchmark to alternative spec-
i￿cations we closely follow Lubik and Schorfheide (2006, LS henceforth), who
apply Bayesian estimation techniques to a simple New Keynesian model by
considering a parsimonious set of time series (speci￿cally, they use observations
from output growth, in￿ ation, and nominal interest rate). Bayesian estimation
for DSGE models is close in spirit to restricted full information maximum likeli-
hood (FIML) estimation, since the subjective element is speci￿ed in both cases.
The peculiarity of the Bayesian MCMC approach is that, instead of employing
interval restrictions on parameters, it requires to nest formalized distributional
priors on parameters with the conditional distribution (i.e., the likelihood) in
order to obtain the posterior distribution. Operationally, we estimate the mode
7of the posterior distribution by maximizing the log posterior function, which
combines the prior information on the parameters with the likelihood of the
data. The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is then used to get a complete pic-
ture of the posterior distribution and to evaluate the marginal likelihood of the
model.9
The model is estimated over the sample period 1983:1-2004:4 by using, as
said, observations on output growth, in￿ ation, and nominal interest rate series
for the U.S.10 Following LS, we log-linearize our model around the balanced
growth steady state, and consider three shocks, a "habit" shock az;t, which
a⁄ects dynamics of the Euler equation, a productivity shock aa;t, which a⁄ects
the production function and marginal costs, and a "demand" shock ad;t, which
a⁄ects (20) (See Appendix B for the details). Shocks dynamics are de￿ned as
follows
az;t = ￿zaz;t￿1 + "z;t
aa;t = ￿aaa;t￿1 + "a;t
ad;t = ￿dad;t￿1 + "d;t
We also consider a monetary policy innovation, "R;t, which is added to the
log-linearized version of (21).11
Priors for the shock distributions are provided by LS (2006), who extract
them from pre-sample observations (1970:1 to 1982:4). The remaining priors are
de￿ned according to the results obtained in previous studies and to economic
reasoning. When possible, distributions for structural parameters are those used
by LS.
Priors for stickiness parameters ￿p and ￿w are based on previous evidence
on the average frequency of price changes, typically obtained from estimates of
the Calvo probabilities of resetting prices and the wages.12 We assume Gamma
distributions for stickiness parameters and set the prior mean at 9:90 for both
￿p and ￿w (corresponding to an average period of 3:3 months for resetting prices
and wages),13 standard deviations are set at 2:0. The beta-distributed priors
for the degrees of price (￿p) and wage (￿w) indexation to past in￿ ation are set
at 0:5, with standard deviations at 0:15. The prior distribution for the inverse
labor supply Frisch elasticity, ￿, is assumed to follow a normal distribution
centered around 2, a large standard deviation (0:8) accounts for uncertainty
about its location; habit parameter b has a beta distribution, mean is set at 0:2
with a standard deviation equal to 0:15; parameter " has a gamma distribution
centered on 1:5 with a standard deviation equal to 0:15.
The priors for the coe¢ cients in the monetary policy rule are loosely centered
around values typically associated with the Taylor rule. Following LS, we assume
9The Bayesian estimation methodology used here is extensively discussed in Smets and
Wouters (2003, 2010) or An and Schorfheide (2007). Some limits and criticisms to this ap-
proach are described in Canova and Sala (2009).
10Data were extracted from the FRED 2 database maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis. Full details on the construction of the data set are provided in LS (2006).
11In this case the shock is not auto-correlated because persistence has already been intro-
duced in equation (21).
12Rotemberg adjustment costs are obtained from Calvo probabilities of resetting prices by
imposing the same ￿rst order dynamics for price- and wage-setting equations in the two models
(for details, see Lombardo and Vestin, 2008).
13In the U.S. an average 26% of U.S. sectorial prices are changed every 3:3 months, (Bils
and Klenow, 2004).
8gamma distributions for ￿￿ and ￿y, respectively setting prior means at 1:5 and
0:5 and standard deviations at 0:25. In addition the interest rate smoothing
parameter ￿m has a beta distribution with 0:5 mean and 0:2 standard deviation.
We also estimate the annual in￿ ation target (￿A), and the real annual interest
(rA) and quarterly growth ( g) rates.14 Their prior distributions are taken from
LS.
The remaining parameters are restricted before the estimation procedure. In





Christiano et al. (2005), the scale parameter ￿m in (1) was set to ensure that in
steady state the consumption-based money velocity is 0:35, which is its observed
average value over the sample period. Goods and labor-type elasticities are set
at values consistent with ￿p = ￿w = 1:2. Finally, ￿ is set to normalize hours to
one in the e¢ cient equilibrium.
The following table summarizes our priors and displays our results.16
Table 1 ￿Parameters and stochastic structure
Prior Posterior
Distr. Mean St.Dev. Mean 5% 95%
￿p Beta 0:50 0:15 0:18 0:06 0:28
￿w Beta 0:50 0:15 0:28 0:10 0:44
b Beta 0:20 0:10 0:61 0:42 0:79
￿p Gamma 9:90 2:00 10:34 7:01 13:53
￿w Gamma 9:90 2:00 10:90 7:81 14:01
￿ Normal 2:00 0:80 1:91 0:77 2:90
" Gamma 1:50 0:20 1:53 1:23 1:84
￿￿ Gamma 1:50 0:25 1:66 1:31 1:99
￿y Gamma 0:50 0:25 0:55 0:30 0:80
￿A Gamma 7:00 2:00 3:36 2:80 3:88
rA Gamma 0:50 0:50 0:53 0:01 0:96
￿Q Normal 0:40 0:20 0:41 0:16 0:63
"a Invgamma 1:25 0:66 1:59 0:75 2:84
"d Invgamma 1:25 0:66 0:45 0:37 0:52
"z Invgamma 0:63 0:33 0:29 0:20 0:37
"R Invgamma 0:50 0:26 0:17 0:14 0:20
￿a Beta 0:80 0:10 0:87 0:78 0:96
￿d Beta 0:80 0:10 0:88 0:79 0:98
￿z Beta 0:66 0:15 0:85 0:76 0:94
￿m Beta 0:50 0:20 0:78 0:72 0:84
From the mean posterior estimates reported in Table 1 we obtain that in
steady state ￿m = 0:026. This, in turn, implies that we estimate a wage disci-
plining e⁄ect of about 3% by reducing the wage markup from 1:20 to 1:17.
Finally, to provide a formal evaluation of the importance of our results
we compare our results with the case where we neglect pre-determined wages
14Parameters ￿A, rA, ￿Q are linked to the model steady state values for in￿ation, growth
and the real interest rate by using: ￿ = 1+￿A=400; ￿ = 1+￿Q=100; R = 1+rA=400+￿A+4￿Q.
15See LS (2006).
16The results reported in this paper have been computed using the Matlab-based Dynare
package. Markov chain Monte Carlo methods are used to generate draws (500:000) from the
posterior distribution of the model parameters. The summary statistics (posterior means and
90% probability intervals) reported are computed by using these draws.
9(￿m = 0).17 The relative performance of our model speci￿cation is measured
by comparison of log data densities.18 Bayesian model selection analysis allows
us formally to compare the two speci￿cations. Following Riggi and Tancioni
(2010), by considering the Laplace approximation,19 the posterior log-likelihood
of including and excluding pre-set wages is ￿296:49 and ￿297:33, respectively.20
The Bayes factor is thus 2:08, a value which indicates an evidence in favor of the
speci￿cation that includes anticipation e⁄ects (i.e., pre set wages and money in
the utility function, ￿m 6= 0) .
5 The long-run Phillips curve and the IRFs to
a monetary shock
Given our estimates for ", ￿, b, ￿ and the values chosen for ￿p￿w, we are able
to characterize a long-run Phillips curve, illustrated in Figure 1.
17The alternative model has been estimated by using the same prior distributions described
in Table 1. Posterior means are very similar. The full outcome of the estimations is available
upon request.
18See LS (2006) or Riggi and Tancioni (2010). Sims (2006) discusses the methodology vis
a vis existing alternatives. Speci￿cally, he discusses in favour of likelihood-based methods for
￿tting and comparing model speci￿cations, as opposed to single-equation or impulse-response
matching approaches.
19Similar results can be obtained by using log marginal data densities computed on Geweke￿ s
modi￿ed harmonic mean estimator. We report Laplace approximation as they are more robust
in our framework, where we test consistency with respect to a large set of parameters in a
small scale model. It is also worth noticing that there is ad adverse e⁄ect on our exercise as
that estimation of more parsimonious model are more likely to be preferred. See Riggi and
Tancioni (2010).
20The alternative model has been estimated by using the same prior distributions described
in Tables 1 and 2. Posterior means are very similar. The full outcome of the estimations is
available upon request.
10Figure 1 ￿Long run Phillips curve
The curve describes the relationship between long-run in￿ ation (i.e., central
bank￿ s targets) and the employment loss, de￿ned as the per cent gap between
actual hours and their e¢ cient level. Our results show that the estimated in￿ a-
tion target (3:36%) implies an employment gap equal to 4:3%, whereas the gap
would grow to 5% and 6:1% if the in￿ ation target fell to 2% and to zero, respec-
tively. A 1% reduction in the net in￿ ation target relative to the 3:36% value
estimated over the sample period would cause a 0:4% employment loss. Ap-
proximately we ￿nd a one to two relationship between the gap and the in￿ ation
rate.










































Figure 2 - IRFs
We comment on the dynamic performance of our model relative to the re-
stricted version where wages are sticky but they non-preset. From (17) it is clear
that the real interest rate increase is associated to a reduction in real money
holdings and to an increase in their marginal utility. This, in turn disciplines
wage claims, i.e. the wage markup falls. As a result we observe a stronger fall
in both wage and price in￿ ation, whereas consumption is stabilized.
6 Conclusions
Empirical micro evidence about wage-setting behavior inspires the key inno-
vation of our paper, that is, the pre-set wages assumption is nested into an
otherwise standard Rotemberg sticky wage model. The pre-determined wages
and money-in-the-utility-function assumptions are su¢ cient to identify a non
vertical long-run Phillips curve. Model estimates suggest that the disciplining
e⁄ect associated to a moderate in￿ ation rate could be substantial. In addition,
the dynamic adjustment to an interest rate shock is characterized by stronger
wage (price) adjustment and relative stability of output and consumption.
We consider our investigation successful, but an important caveat is that our
approach should be tested within richer medium-scale models that, e.g., account
for a characterization on the money market. For instance, one should introduce
the cash in advance constraint that generates the working capital channel of
monetary policy, as described in Christiano et al. (2005). In addition, it would
12be interesting to estimate the empirical relevance of our wage-setting mechanism
for di⁄erent countries and over di⁄erent sample periods. All this is left for future
research.
Appendix A ￿Wage moderation e⁄ect












































































Under the assumption that " > 1, @l(￿)=@￿ is unambiguously positive.
Appendix B ￿The estimated model.
In order to take the model to the data we follow Lubik and Schorfeide (2005).
In particular, we impose the same stochastic structure imposed by them and
use their prior to estimate our model, which is a generalization of LS (2005)
to imperfect labor markets. It is worth to noticing that a di⁄erent stochastic
structure does not a⁄ect any of the theoretical results reported in the paper as
all of them are derived for the long run (steady state).
B1. Stochastic structure
Following LS (2005), we introduce two shocks in the production function,
Yt = Aa;tAz
tLt (28)
where At is a canonical productivity shock and Az
t is a non stationary distur-
bance, which determines the growth rate ￿ (i.e., AZ
t =AZ
t￿1 = ￿). Speci￿cally,
we consider Aa;t and Az;t = AZ
t =￿AZ
t+1 (thus along the balanced growth path
Az = 1), in log they are assumed to behave as an AR(1) process:
az;t = ￿zaz;t￿1 + "z;t
aa;t = ￿aaa;t￿1 + "a;t


























13where ht;i = ct;i ￿ b￿ct￿1;i is e⁄ective consumption under habit formation.
The presence of the term Az
t in the above expression implies that households
derive utility from e⁄ective consumption relative to the level of technology and
guarantees that the model has a balanced growth path along which hours worked
are stationary even if more general preference function for consumption are
























It is worth noticing that Az￿ and h=Az are stationary along the balanced
growth path and that Az is an habit-driven shock to the marginal utility of
consumption. If b = 0, marginal utility of consumption no longer depends on
Az.
The remaining two shocks a⁄ect the aggregate resource constraint and the















with Ad;t in log deviations
ad;t = ￿dad;t￿1 + "d;t (33)
Regarding the latter we just consider an innovation, "R;t, in the log linear
Taylor rule, where persistence is already modelled by interest rate inertia.
B2. Habits equation
The habits equation is:

































Az (1 ￿ b) (37)







(^ ct￿1 ￿ az;t) (38)
14B3. Marginal utility of income













In the steady state (by using (37)), it implies
Az￿ =
1





We log linearize (39) and get




























































Log linearization of (43) is
￿^ ￿t = ￿^ ￿t+1 ￿
￿




The price equation is
￿ ￿ mct
1 ￿ ￿



















































It follows that the log linearization of (47) is
￿
1 ￿ ￿
c mct + ￿p (^ ￿t ￿ ￿p^ ￿t￿1) = ￿￿p (^ ￿t+1 ￿ ￿p^ ￿t) (48)






and Az;t+1 do not a⁄ect the dynamics,














After log linearization it becomes:
c mct = ^ wt ￿ aa;t (50)
B6. Wage equation












































Log linearization of (51) is
w￿
￿

































Aggregate resource constraint (28) implies
^ yt = ^ ct + ad;t (55)
Production function (32) implies
^ yt = ^ lt + aa;t (56)
The log linearization of the Taylor rule (21) is
^ Rt = ￿m ^ Rt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿m)
￿
 ￿^ ￿t +  ￿y (￿^ yt + ^ zt)
￿
+ ^ "Rt (57)
16B8. Measurement equations
Measurement equations relate the net annualized per-cent in￿ ation (￿Obs) and
nominal interest rate (RObs), and the quarterly net per-cent growth rate (gObs)
to the model as follows:21
￿Obs
t = ￿A + 4￿t (58)
RObs
t = rA + ￿A + 4￿Q + 4Rt (59)
gObs
t = ￿Q + yt + yt￿1 + zt (60)
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